Article

Jan 15, 2026

The $1 Trillion Refinancing Gap: How Banks Abandoned CRE Sponsors in 2026

a group of tall buildings under construction
a group of tall buildings under construction
a group of tall buildings under construction

Here's a number that should terrify every commercial real estate lender who isn't nimble: $1–2 trillion in CRE debt matures through 2026.

Here's a number that should terrify every CRE sponsor: traditional banks have systematically tightened lending standards to the point where 30–40% of this debt cannot refinance at bank rates and terms.

The result is a structural refinancing gap—a $300–500 billion chasm between what sponsors need to refinance existing debt and what traditional banks are willing to provide. This gap isn't cyclical. It's not temporary. It's the new reality of commercial real estate finance in 2026.

For sponsors, this means equity injections, leverage reduction, or finding alternative capital. For private lenders, it means unprecedented opportunity. For brokers and advisors, it means understanding where the gap exists—and positioning clients to the right capital source before they hit the wall.

This article examines the $1 trillion refinancing wall, why the gap exists, and what it means for CRE capital in 2026.

The Numbers: $1T Maturity + Bank Pullback = The Gap

Annual CRE Debt Maturity Schedule:

The U.S. commercial real estate market carries roughly $3.5–4 trillion in outstanding debt. Maturity is front-loaded:

  • 2025: $300–350B in CRE debt matures

  • 2026: $250–300B matures (continuing pressure)

  • 2027: $200–250B matures (volume drops off)

  • 2028+: $150–200B annually (normalized)

Translation: Peak maturity is 2025–2026. Q1 2026 is the spike.

Bank Lending Capacity:

Banks have historically financed 50–60% of CRE originations. But in 2025–2026, bank market share is declining:

  • Pre-2008: Banks financed ~65% of CRE

  • 2010–2020: Banks financed ~55–60% of CRE

  • 2021–2023: Banks financed ~50–55% of CRE

  • 2024–2026: Banks financing ~35–45% of CRE (accelerating decline)

Why the decline?

  • Regulatory capital requirements (Basel III)

  • Commercial real estate concentration limits

  • CRE stress test failures for large banks

  • Rising delinquencies in certain asset classes (office, retail, hospitality)

  • Conservative risk appetite post-COVID

Bank Lending Standards (The Real Constraint):

Beyond pure capacity, banks have tightened underwriting:

Metric

2019 (Peak)

2026 (Current)

Gap

LTV Cap

70–75%

60–65%

–5 to –10 pp

DSCR Minimum

1.20x

1.35–1.50x

+0.15 to +0.30x

Interest Rate Assumption

3.5–4.0%

6.5–7.5%

+3.0 to +3.5 pp

Rent Growth Assumption

3–4% annually

1.5–2.5% annually

–1.5 to –2.5 pp

Occupancy Assumption

95%+

90–92%

–3 to –5 pp

Sponsorship Requirement

Proven track record

Institutional-tier only

Significant tightening

What this means in practice:

A property that refinanced at 70% LTV in 2021 might only qualify for 60–65% LTV in 2026. If the loan balance hasn't declined much (sponsor didn't amortize aggressively), the LTV gap = refinancing shortfall.

Example:

  • Property value: $20M (stable)

  • Existing loan: $14M (originated at 70% LTV in 2019, minimal amortization)

  • New bank LTV max: 65% = max refinance of $13M

  • Refinancing gap: $1M (1 to 3 year maturity cliff)

Multiply this across thousands of properties, and you get a $300–500B refinancing gap.

Who Gets Hurt: The Refinancing Casualty Matrix

Not all sponsors are equal in the 2026 refinancing environment. The gap hits hardest on specific segments:

Segment 1: Class B/C Multifamily (25% of maturing debt)

Profile:

  • 10–25 years old, secondary/tertiary market

  • Rent growth 1–2% annually (below market)

  • Occupancy 88–92% (slightly below market)

  • Original leverage: 70–75% LTV

  • Sponsors: Mid-market operators (not institutional)

Refinancing Reality:

  • Bank will refinance at 55–60% LTV only (not 70%)

  • New rates: 7.0–7.5% (vs. 3.5–4% original)

  • DSCR required: 1.35–1.50x (vs. 1.20x original)

  • Result: Property cannot support refinancing gap + higher rate debt service

Outcome: 60% will require mezzanine or bridge capital. 20% will sell. 20% will hold and harvest (stop paying debt).

Segment 2: Office (20% of maturing debt)

Profile:

  • Pre-2005 construction or pre-2015 non-renovated

  • 60–75% occupancy (declining)

  • Rent stagnant or declining

  • Original leverage: 65–70% LTV

  • Sponsors: Generalist or value-add operators

Refinancing Reality:

  • Banks won't refinance at any LTV (office is off-limits for many banks)

  • Life company might lend at 50–55% LTV only

  • New rates: 7.5–8.5%

  • DSCR challenge: Property can't support higher rates + lower occupancy

  • Result: Refinancing is functionally impossible with traditional lenders

Outcome: 40% will require creative restructuring or bridge capital. 40% will face distress. 20% will sell at significant loss.

Segment 3: Retail (15% of maturing debt)

Profile:

  • Strip centers or secondary malls

  • 80–88% occupancy (tenant turnover risk)

  • Rent pressures from e-commerce

  • Original leverage: 65–70% LTV

  • Sponsors: Portfolio landlords or 1031 buyers

Refinancing Reality:

  • Banks are selective; life companies have retreated

  • LTV capped at 55–60%

  • Rates: 7.5–8.5%

  • Tenant credit is weak, so DSCR ceiling is low

  • Result: Many retail deals cannot refinance at any price

Outcome: 50% require gap financing or bridge. 30% face distress. 20% sell.

Segment 4: Hotel/Hospitality (10% of maturing debt)

Profile:

  • Leisure or urban gateway properties

  • Occupancy 75–85% (volatile)

  • Rate compression from post-COVID recovery

  • Original leverage: 60–70% LTV

  • Sponsors: Operators or institutional hospitality investors

Refinancing Reality:

  • Banks highly selective; many won't lend

  • Life company is primary source

  • LTV: 50–60% maximum

  • Rates: 7.5–8.5%

  • Volatility in occupancy = high DSCR required (1.40–1.50x)

  • Result: Many properties can't support refinancing

Outcome: 45% need gap financing or bridge. 35% face distress. 20% refinance with life company at lower terms.

Segment 5: Premium/Trophy Assets (20% of maturing debt)

Profile:

  • Class A or iconic properties

  • 92%+ occupancy, rent growth 2.5–3.5%

  • Prime locations (NYC, SF, LA, Chicago)

  • Original leverage: 65–70% LTV

  • Sponsors: Institutional or large REITs

Refinancing Reality:

  • Banks actively bidding (flight-to-quality)

  • LTV available: 65–70%

  • Rates: 6.5–7.0%

  • DSCR easily achievable (1.35–1.50x)

  • Result: Refinancing is available at acceptable terms

Outcome: 85% refinance with banks. 10% refinance with life companies. 5% use bridge temporarily.

The Refinancing Gap Math: Where It Concentrates

Total CRE Debt Maturing 2025–2026: ~$600B

Breakdown by segment:

  • Class B/C Multifamily: $150B (25%)

  • Office: $120B (20%)

  • Retail: $90B (15%)

  • Hotel/Hospitality: $60B (10%)

  • Premium/Trophy: $120B (20%)

  • Other (industrial, land, etc.): $60B (10%)

Refinancing by Outcome:

Segment

Total Debt

Bank Refinance %

Gap Financing Need

Distress/Sale %

Class B/C MF

$150B

40%

40%

20%

Office

$120B

15%

25%

60%

Retail

$90B

30%

40%

30%

Hotel

$60B

40%

30%

30%

Trophy

$120B

85%

10%

5%

Other

$60B

60%

25%

15%

TOTAL

$600B

~52%

~30%

~18%

Calculation:

  • Bank refinance: $312B (52%)

  • Gap financing need: $180B (30%)

  • Distress/sale: $108B (18%)

The $180B Gap:

This $180B represents deals that cannot refinance with traditional banks and require alternative capital. It breaks down as:

Capital Source

Share of Gap

Amount

Mezzanine/Bridge

40%

$72B

Private CMBS/Debt Funds

35%

$63B

Sponsor Equity Injection

15%

$27B

Life Company Secondary

10%

$18B

Why Banks Retreated: The Four Reasons

Reason 1: Regulatory Capital Requirements

Post-2008 (Dodd-Frank, Basel III), banks must hold capital against their loans. CRE loans require higher capital (typically 2–4% of loan balance).

Example: A bank holds $10B in CRE loans. They must hold $200–400M in capital. That capital has an opportunity cost (could earn 5%+ in other businesses). For a $500M gain in net interest income on CRE, the capital cost might be $20–40M annually. Economics don't work.

Result: Banks are rationing CRE capital to highest-tier deals only (lower risk = lower capital requirement).

Reason 2: CRE Stress Test Failures

The Federal Reserve's annual stress tests have flagged CRE as a risk sector. Large banks that fail stress tests face capital restrictions and regulatory pressure.

In 2023–2024, several large regional banks failed CRE stress tests. This drove aggressive portfolio reductions and new deal origination freezes.

Result: Large banks (the ones with capacity) are now pulling back the hardest.

Reason 3: Rising CRE Delinquencies

Office and retail delinquencies are elevated:

  • Office delinquencies: 3–4% (vs. 0.5–1% historically)

  • Retail delinquencies: 2–3% (vs. 0.5–1% historically)

  • Multifamily delinquencies: 1–2% (vs. 0.3–0.5% historically)

Banks with significant office/retail portfolios are taking losses. This has made them gun-shy on new originations in these asset classes.

Result: Asset class discrimination (banks won't lend on office or secondary retail at any LTV).

Reason 4: Rising Rates Changed the Economics

For sponsors, the jump from 3.5% to 6.5–7.5% rates is existential. For banks, it's also problematic:

A bank originating a loan at 6.5% sounds good in nominal terms. But:

  • Credit losses (default risk) might increase 50% due to higher debt service burden

  • Prepayment speeds slow (borrowers hold loans longer, limiting turnover)

  • Portfolio rebalancing opportunities shrink (fewer refinances, fewer exit opportunities)

Banks originally modeled 3.5% rates as "stable;" now they're modeling 6.5% as "risky." The psychology has shifted.

Result: Banks are pricing for risk they didn't expect, which causes them to pull back further.

The Refinancing Wall in Real Time: 2026 Timeline

Q1 2026 (Peak Maturity):
  • $200–250B in CRE debt matures

  • Sponsors scramble to refinance or find bridge capital

  • Banks are selective; private lenders are active

  • Spreads widen on bridge capital (high demand, limited supply)

  • First distressed sales emerge

Q2 2026:
  • Q1 maturity cliff passes; volume moderates

  • Properties that didn't refinance in Q1 are either bridged, extended, or entering distress

  • Distressed sale market accelerates

  • Private lenders are managing aging bridge portfolios

  • Permanent market stabilizes slightly

Q3–Q4 2026:
  • Maturity normalizes

  • Bridge conversions accelerate (sponsors either refinance into permanent or sell)

  • Distressed portfolio sales peak (lenders and servicers offloading problem assets)

  • Private lender exits accelerate

  • 2026 vintage bridges are performing or struggling; sorting occurs

2027:
  • Post-refinancing wall hangover resolves

  • Market reprices; new lending norms emerge

  • Sponsors who made it through are stabilized or have exited

  • Survivors are generally better positioned (higher equity, lower leverage)

The Gap Financing Solutions: Private Capital Steps In

Private lenders are filling the $180B gap with four primary strategies:

Strategy 1: Mezzanine Layering (40% of gap capital)

How it works: Bank refinances at 60% LTV. Private lender adds mezzanine at 10–15% LTV. Total: 70–75% leverage.

Example:

  • Bank senior: $12M at 65% LTV, 7% rate

  • Private mezz: $2M at 10% LTV, 10.5% rate + 5% equity kicker

  • Sponsor equity: $5M (25%)

  • Total: $19M on $20M asset (95% financed with bank + mezz combo)

Outcome: Sponsor avoids equity injection; maintains control and upside capture.

Market volume: ~$72B in mezzanine capital needed in 2026.

Strategy 2: Bridge Capital (35% of gap capital)

How it works: Private lender provides bridge at higher LTV (70–75%) for 12–24 month hold while sponsor either stabilizes asset or refinances into permanent.

Example:

  • Property value: $20M

  • Existing loan: $14M (can't refinance with bank at current terms)

  • Bridge: $13M at 70% LTV, 8.5% rate, 18-month term

  • Sponsor uses bridge proceeds to pay off old debt + inject equity

  • Exit: Stabilize and refinance with bank in 18 months at better terms

Outcome: Sponsor buys time; asset improves; permanent refinance happens at better terms.

Market volume: ~$63B in bridge capital needed in 2026.

Strategy 3: Sponsor Equity Injection (15% of gap capital)

How it works: Sponsor injects equity to reduce leverage, improving LTV and DSCR for bank refinance.

Example:

  • Property value: $20M

  • Existing loan: $14M

  • Bank will only refinance $12M (60% LTV)

  • Gap: $2M

  • Sponsor injects $2M equity + reduces leverage to 60%

  • Bank refinances $12M

Outcome: Sponsor dilutes equity position but maintains asset ownership.

Market volume: ~$27B in sponsor equity injections in 2026.

Strategy 4: Life Company Secondary (10% of gap capital)

How it works: Sponsor can't refinance with bank; life company steps in at lower LTV and higher rates.

Example:

  • Bank: Won't refinance at 65% LTV (too risky)

  • Life company: Will refinance at 55% LTV, 7.5% rate

  • Sponsor gap: $1M (shortfall between old debt and new refinance)

  • Sponsor either bridges the gap or injects equity

Outcome: Sponsor refinances but at reduced leverage and higher rates.

Market volume: ~$18B in life company secondary refinancing in 2026.

The Broker's Playbook: Navigating the Gap

If you're representing a sponsor with a maturing loan in 2026, here's how to structure the conversation:

Step 1: Refinancing Assessment (6 months before maturity)
  • Pull the loan documents and existing terms

  • Calculate current LTV and DSCR

  • Get a current appraisal or BPO (broker price opinion)

  • Determine new rates and new bank requirements

  • Calculate what new bank would lend (using 60–65% LTV, 7–7.5% rates, 1.35–1.50x DSCR)

Step 2: Gap Analysis
  • Compare existing debt to what bank will refinance

  • If gap < 5%: Sponsor can likely inject equity or bridge short-term

  • If gap 5–15%: Mezzanine is likely solution

  • If gap > 15%: Full bridge or significant equity injection needed

Step 3: Capital Strategy
  • If bank will fully refinance: Move forward with bank (lowest cost)

  • If mezzanine is needed: Shop banks + private mezz lenders in parallel

  • If bridge is needed: Approach private bridge lenders; establish timeline and exit strategy

  • If significant equity injection required: Determine sponsor's appetite and capital availability

Step 4: Lender Approach
  • Bank first (cheaper, longer terms, fixed rate)

  • Life company second (if bank declines)

  • Private mezzanine third (if bank at low LTV)

  • Private bridge fourth (if other options fail or timeline is urgent)

Step 5: Structure Optimization
  • Bank + mezz combo often best (lower blended cost than bridge alone)

  • But: Requires dual lender coordination (more complexity)

  • Bridge is faster (1–2 week commitment vs. 30–60 day bank process)

  • Bridge is more expensive (8–9% vs. 6.5–7% bank rate)

Step 6: Monitor and Execute
  • Track market rate movements (if rates drop, refinancing odds improve)

  • Lock in terms early if market is moving unfavorably

  • Build relationship with backup lenders (don't rely on primary lender alone)

  • Communicate with lenders proactively on any asset changes

The New Normal: What Happens After 2026

If you're thinking 2026 is temporary, think again. Several structural factors suggest the new lending environment is here to stay:

1. Regulatory Regime Won't Change Basel III and stress testing are permanent. Banks will continue rationing CRE capital.

2. Rising Default Rates Won't Reverse Office delinquencies are structural (remote work is permanent). This will keep banks cautious on CRE for years.

3. Rates Are Likely to Stay Elevated Federal Reserve may eventually cut rates, but CRE spreads are rising. Even if base rates fall, CRE rates may not fall as much as expected.

4. Private Capital is Here to Stay With $1.7T+ in private credit globally and trillions in institutional capital seeking yield, private lenders are now permanent players in CRE finance—not cyclical participants.

Implication: The 2026 refinancing wall will create a new baseline in CRE finance. Sponsors and lenders who adapt will thrive. Those who wait for "things to return to normal" will be left behind.

Conclusion: Preparation is Everything

The $1 trillion refinancing wall is not theoretical—it's happening right now. Sponsors with loans maturing in Q1 2026 are already feeling the pressure. Brokers are fielding calls from panicked sponsors. Lenders are overwhelmed with inbound volume.

For sponsors: Get ahead of your maturity. Talk to multiple lenders (bank + private) simultaneously. Don't wait until 90 days before maturity. Start conversations now.

For brokers: Understand the gap. Know which sponsors will easily refinance (trophy assets), which need mezzanine (Class B), and which will face distress (Class C, office, retail). Position them accordingly.

For lenders: The refinancing wall is your biggest opportunity in years. Sponsors who can't get bank capital need you. Deploy capital decisively, but underwrite carefully. The 2026 vintage bridges that perform will define your portfolio for years.

The refinancing wall is real. But it's navigable for those who are prepared.

C2R Capital is deploying $50M+ into the refinancing gap in 2026—bridge financing, mezzanine capital, and creative restructuring. We understand the dynamics of the wall, we move fast (10–14 day closings), and we structure for sponsor success. If you have a loan maturing in 2026 that can't refinance with banks, reach out. We're here to bridge the gap.

/ Have a deal ready for review?

We're deploying our $100 million fund in Q1 '26.

Have your deal reviewed within 72 hours by our decision-makers.
Careers Image
Careers Image
Careers Image